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The Role of Agency and Sale in Antitrust:
General Electric, Simpson, Schwinn
Shirley Z. Johnson*
The importance of the nature of a vertical1 relationship-
whether it is one of sale or agency-as the test for determining
antitrust violations in agreements between noncompetitors was
given a stay of execution by the United States Supreme Court
in a 1967 antitrust decision 2 after an apparent sentence of death
in 1964.3 These decisions are significant because they involve
what are probably the most common noncompetitor agreements
which may violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act4-price-fixing,
territory allocation and customer restriction.
In 1967, the Supreme Court in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Company5 held that vertical customer and territorial
restrictions are per se6 illegal where the relationship between
the restrictor and the restricted is one of sale; where the rela-
tionship is one of agency, the Rule of Reason is to be applied.
* Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department
of Justice.
1. Vertical arrangements have been defined as "[e]conomic ar-
rangements between companies standing in a supplier-customer rela-
tionship ..... " Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323
(1962). Horizontal arrangements have been defined as "[e]conomic
arrangement[s] between companies performing similar functions in
the production or sale of comparable goods or services ..... Id.
at 334.
2. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
3. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides
in substance:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy declared ... to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...
5. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
6. The Sherman Act was early interpreted to embrace only prac-
tices which operate to the prejudice of the public interest by unduly
restricting competition. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911). However, certain "agreements or practices ... because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable .... " These offenses are per
se illegal. No inquiry need be made as to the harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
7. The so-called Rule of Reason refers to judicial analysis of the
purpose and effect of a restriction, in the light of the surrounding facts,
to determine whether it unreasonably restrains trade.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Three years prior, in Simpson v. Union Oil Company," the
Court in effect rejected agency as a defense to a vertical price-
fixing agreement. It did this even though in 1926 it had ruled,
in United States v. General Electric Company,9 a case almost
factually identical to Simpson, that agency is a defense to vertical
price-fixing.1 0
Schwinn and Simpson are similar in their implied rejection
of agency as a defense to the illegality of certain vertical agree-
ments. In so doing they appear to conflict directly with G.E.
Yet, Schwinn and Simpson differ conspicuously from each other.
In Schwinn the nature of the vertical relationship determined
the test of illegality to be applied, while in Simpson the nature
of the relationship was ignored. Thus, G.E., Simpson, and
Schwinn each seem to view the nature of a vertical relationship
diversely: G.E. as a defense if the relationship is an agency,
Simpson as having no legal significance, and Schwinn as de-
terminative of the test of illegality to be applied.
Since the 1967 Schwinn decision did not distinguish Simpson,
and Simpson did not expressly overrule G.E., the role of agency
and sale in antitrust law is in a state of confusion. This ar-
ticle is an attempt to arrive at a coherent statement regarding
the nature of a vertical relationship in antitrust law. This pur-
pose will be carried out by discussing G.E., Simpson, and Schwinn
in the following contexts:
I. Agency as a Defense in Antitrust Cases
II. The Nature of a Vertical Relationship as Determinative
of the Applicable Standard of Illegality in Antitrust
Cases
III. The Future of Agency in Antitrust Law
I. AGENCY AS A DEFENSE IN ANTITRUST CASES
The first significant case establishing the importance of the
nature of a vertical relationship to alleged violations of the
Sherman Act was the G.E. case, decided in 1926. The relevant
issue in G.E. was whether General Electric could set the price
at which 21,000 consignees were to sell patented lamps which it
8. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
9. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
10. The Court purported to distinguish Simpson from G.E. on the
ground that G.E. involved patented products while the products in
Simpson were unpatented. For a discussion of the meaningfulness of
this distinction see note 37, infra, and accompanying text.
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manufacured. 11 The Court first decided that:
The validity of the Electric Company's scheme of distribution of
its electric lamps turns . . . on the question whether the sales
are by the company through its agents to the consumer, or are
in fact by the company to the so-called agents at the time of
consignment.' 2
After examining the terms of General Electric's agreement with
its consignees, the Court concluded that the relationship was a
genuine agency,13 and that "[t]he owner of an article, patented
or otherwise, is not violating the common law, or the Anti-
11. G.E. involved two issues. The one with which this article is
concerned was whether General Electric could require its consignees
to sell at prices set by General Electric. The other issue was whether
General Electric could require its licensees to sell at prices it set, the
Court holding that it could. The United States sought unsuccessfully
to have the portion of the G.E. opinion dealing with licensees overruled
in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1947) and in United
States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 382 U.S. 197 (1965) (affirmed by equally
divided Court).
12. 272 U.S. at 485.
13. The test of whether a relationship is one of principal-agent or
seller-purchaser is whether title passes to the intermediary, and then to
the ultimate customer, or whether title passes directly from the princi-
pal to the ultimate customer. See, e.g., CBS Business Equip. Corp.
v. Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). A court
determines whether title has passed by examining the terms of the rela-
tionship. No single feature of a relationship is determinative. For
example, in G.E. a consignment existed where the agent bore the risk
of nonpayment by the ultimate customer, while in Butterick Co. v.
FTC, 4 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925), the arrangement was one of sale where
the buyer bore the credit risk. Moreover, it does not matter whether
the parties call the agreement an agency or a sale. Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1908).
The courts appear to employ a type of balancing test to see if
factors pointing to agency outweigh factors pointing to sale. In the
G.E. case, pointing to agency were the following indicia: General
Electric paid all taxes on the stock; General Electric bore all risk of
loss from fire, flood, obsolescence and price decline; and title was to
remain in General Electric until sold by the consignee. Pointing to
sale were the following factors: the consignor was responsible for
lost, missing or damaged lamps; was required to pay for storage,
transportation, handling, sale and distribution costs; and bore the credit
risk. Among cases, other than G.E., using a balancing type of analysis
are Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922);
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943);
Ford Motor Co. v. Union Motor Sales Co., 244 F. 156 (6th Cir. 1917).
In categorizing the nature of the relationship, the courts examine
the terms of any formal agreement as well as the actual operation of
the relationship as well as the terms of the formal agreements. Some
cases have labeled as "sham" agencies those arrangements in which the
form of the relationship, but not the substance, was one of agency.
Thus, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803,
805 (6th Cir. 1908), the court held that the agreement involved was an
effort "to disguise the wholesale dealers in the mask of agency."
19681
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Trust [sic] law, by . . . fixing the price by which his agents
transfer the title from him directly to such consumer."'14
The Court expressly rejected the argument that the large
number of agents involved and the extension of the scheme
throughout the United States brought General Electric within
the antitrust laws. The Court explained that the patent laws
gave General Electric a monopoly for making, using and selling
the patented article which limited neither the number of articles
sold nor the territory of the United States where they were to
be sold.
As long as he [the patentee] makes no effort to fasten upon
ownership of the articles he sells control of the prices at which
his purchaser shall sell, it makes no difference how widespread
his monopoly.15
From the time G.E. was decided, until the Simpson decision
almost 40 years later, it was unquestioned that an agreement
between parties standing in an agency relationship was immune
from violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'6 Simpson
destroyed that assumption.
The Simpson case involved consignment agreements which
Union Oil, a gasoline supplier, required the lessees of its retail
outlets to sign. The consignment agreements fixed resale prices
and were terminated at the end of the lease. Simpson, a con-
signee-lessee, had his lease terminated because he refused to fol-
low prices set by Union Oil.
The Court held that Union Oil's so-called consignment agree-
ments with approximately 1,978 lessee retailers' 7 in eight western
states fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act. The basis of
the Simpson decision appears to be the same ground rejected by
the Court in G.E.; that is, a consignor cannot set the price at
which his consignees are to sell where the consignment system is
14. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926).
15. Id. at 485.
16. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 26 (1964) (dissent).
However, forewarning the fragility of agency as a defense was United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), which held parties to
"agency" agreements guilty of price-fixing. Masonite is distinguishable
from G.E., Simpson, and Schwinn, however, as all parties, including the
"principal" to the agency agreements, were found by the Court to be in
fact horizontal competitors.
17. Union Oil on December 31, 1957 supplied gas to 4,133 retail
stations in eight western states. Two thousand, three of the stations
were owned or leased by Union Oil and leased or subleased to inde-
pendent retailers. As of that date, Union Oil had consignment agree-
ments with 1,978 (99%) of the lessee-retailers and with 1,327 (63%)
of the nonlessee-retailers. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 15
n.1 (1964).
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vast and fixes prices through many retail outlets. The Court
did not analyze the nature of the relationship between Union
Oil and its consignees to determine whether it was one of agency
or sale as was done in G.E., but looked at the effects of the
agreements. Nowhere did the Court indicate that the nature of
the relationship between Union Oil and the dealers had any
bearing on the legality of the price-fixing. Justice Douglas,
author of the majority opinion, noted the coercive effects of the
consignment agreement. He said that the consignment agree-
ment and lease "coercively laced"'18 dealers into an arrangement
under which Union Oil was allowed to impose noncompetitive
prices on thousands whose prices otherwise might be competitive.
Later Justice Douglas referred to the "present, coercive 'con-
signment' 19 and to an agreement for resale price maintenance,
"coercively employed."20
In the majority's view,2 ' whether the relationship between
Union Oil and its "consignees" was one of agency or sale was
immaterial. The crucial factor was whether the "'consignment'
device [was] used to cover a vast... distribution system, fixing
prices through many retail outlets. 12 2 Where this exists, the
Court said, the "anti-trust laws prevent calling the 'consign-
ment' an agency. '23  This pronouncement is subject to two
interpretations. One, Union Oil had an agency relationship
with its consignees but agency is not a defense where certain
effects are present. Two, the nature of a vertical relationship is
unimportant to a determination of legality where certain anti-
competitive effects are present. The two views are primarily a
difference of semantics since the result is the same under either
interpretation. However, the second interpretation seems more
accurate, as the first assumes the Court concluded that Union
Oil had a genuine agency form of distribution. Such an assump-
tion is unwarranted since the Court did not label the relationship
an agency, and, in fact, gave some indication that it did not be-
18. Id. at 21.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 24. Since Simpson seems to indicate that the consign-
ment agreements were illegal because they were coercively employed
by Union Oil's policy of cancelling the lease if the prices set by Union
were not maintained, it may be that consignment agreements which
fix prices for non-lessees are legal.
21. Five justices took part in the majority opinion. Mr. Justice
Brennan and Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote separate opinions, Mr. Justice
Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion, and Mr. Justice Harlan took no
part in the case.




lieve the Union Oil consignment arrangement to be a true agency
relationship.24
The Court obviously avoided a formalistic distinction be-
tween agency and sale, as made in G.E., because it feared that
if the nature of a relationship is determinative of legality, the
result will be a test of skill in draftsmanship. Justice Douglas
said that to call a consignment an agency under the circum-
stances existing in Simpson would result in avoidance of illegal-
ity "merely by clever manipulation of words, not by differ-
ences in substance."25
Although the Court ignored the nature of Union Oil's rela-
tionship with its consignees as bearing on the issue of illegality,
the Court did briefly comment on the relationship. Justice Doug-
las termed Union Oil's consignment agreements as "somewhat
parallel"'26 to those employed by General Electric. Justice Stew-
art, in dissent, more accurately termed the General Electric and
Union Oil consignment agreements as "virtually indistinguish-
able. '27 In both, the consignor paid some taxes on stock (Gen-
eral Electric paid all taxes and Union Oil paid all property
taxes); the consignor had title until sold by the consignee; and
the consignee bore the cost of handling, sale, and operation.
Justice Douglas indirectly questioned whether the consignments
of Union Oil were true consignments by putting quotation marks
around the word "consignment" when referring to the Union-
Simpson relationship. Also, the Court's statement that the
"[d] ealers . . . are independent businessmen; and they have all
or most of the indicia of entrepreneurs, except for price-fixing,"23
suggests the Court felt there was not a true consignment.
This is further suggested by the Court's attempt to find factors
in General Electric's consignment arrangement differentiating it
from Union Oil's agreements. 29 However, Justice Douglas does
not state that the consignments in Simpson were sham agen-
cies; nor does he label the relationships as either agency or
24. See notes 28 and 29 infra, and accompanying text.
25. 377 U.S. at 13. In a 1942 antitrust case, United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942), Justice Douglas similarly
stated that legality must not turn on counsels' manipulation of the
concepts of "sale" and "agency" but on the "significance of the business
practices in terms of restraint of trade." However, as indicated previ-
ously, courts have avoided deceptive draftsmanship by looking to the
substance of the relationship as well as the form. See note 13, supra.
26. 377 U.S. at 22-23.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 20.
29. Id. at 23 n.10.
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sale.30
The Court might have distinguished Simpson from G.E. on
the ground that Union Oil's marketing arrangements were not
true consignments, but really sale arrangements. Simpson
only hinted at this. Numerous cases 31 have examined a pur-
ported agency relationship, weighed factors pointing to sale and
those pointing to agency, and held that the relationship was
one of sale. In G.E., the Court specifically indicated that the
consignment was a "genuine" agency. However, as the Gen-
eral Electric and Simpson consignment arrangements were so
factually similar, it seems it would have been difficult for the
Court to have distinguished them.
In any case, the Court avoided a formalistic distinction
between agency and sale. Instead, the Court distinguished G.E.
on the ground that it involved patented products while Simpson
did not. The Court said the ratio decidendi of the G.E. case was
that "patent laws which give a 17-year monopoly on 'making,
using, or selling the invention' are in pari materia with the anti-
trust laws and modify them pro tanto.' '32 The Court's discus-
sion of patents referred to the portion of the G.E. opinion in
which the Court rejected the argument that the comprehen-
siveness and size of the General Electric system brought it
within the antitrust laws-the same argument which was ac-
cepted by the Court in Simpson. Thus the Simpson Court lim-
ited G.E.'s holding to agency arrangements involving patented
products. It appears to have done so despite the fact that the
Court in G.E. expressly stated that its ruling that genuine
agency is a defense to vertical price-fixing applies to "article [s],
patented and otherwise."3 3  Moreover, as the Simpson dissent
points out,34 G.E. gave no intimation that its result would differ
if any of General Electric's lamps had been unpatented. The
only issue in G.E. was whether the consignees were to be treated
as agents, or owners of the lamps consigned to them.3 5  In
addition, no case prior to Simpson suggested that patented arti-
cles should be given special treatment in the consignment situa-
tion.
30. The dissent, nevertheless, claimed that the majority trans-
formed the relationship from agency to sale. Id. at 26.
31. Butterick Co. v. FTC, 4 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925), and cases cited
note 13 supra.
32. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
33. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926).
34. 377 U.S. at 28.
35. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1926).
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The outcome of the Simpson decision seems laudatory.3
Union Oil's price-fixing arrangement had the undesirable effect
of stifling price competition among several thousand retailers
who were essentially independent businessmen. Thus, it was
in the interest of competition to hold such agreements to be
illegal. However, to distinguish G.E. on patent grounds seems
weak.8 7  The rationale of the G.E. case was that the owner of
goods has the right to determine the price at which he will sell.
It was not that the owner of patented products has the right to
set resale prices while the owner of unpatented products does
not. To the contrary, G.E. indicated patented and unpatented
products should be treated the same.
The status of the law after G.E. and Simpson seems to be
as follows: Vertical price-fixing is legal where the article in-
volved is patented and the relationship between the manufac-
turer and seller is one of genuine agency.38 However, where
the relationship is one of sale, vertical price-fixing violates the
antitrust laws whether or not the product is patented. More-
over, where the article upon which a price is fixed is not patented
and the distribution arrangement is vast and fixes prices through
many retail outlets,3 9 the agency nature of the relationship is
.36. However, it may be unfair to apply the Simpson decision retro-
actively to consignment arrangements which were formed in reliance on
G.E. Several courts, including Simpson, 377 U.S. at 24-25, have recog-
nized this. See, e.g., CBS Business Equip. Corp. v. Underwood Corp.,
240 F. Supp. 413, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
235 F. Supp. 526, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).'
37. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Simpson, stated that the Court
sought "to distinguish that case [G.E.] upon the specious ground that its
underpinnings rest on patent law." 377 U.S. at 27. Among literature
finding the patent distinction unconvincing are the following: Rahl,
The Demise of Vertical Price Fixing Through Consignment Arrange-
ments: The Simpson Case. 29 A.B.A. SEcT. ANTITRUST 216, 223 (1965);
Note, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 165, 170 (1964); Note, 16 SYRAcusE L. REV.
116, 118 (1964); Note, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 569, 573 (1965).
38. Certainly the implication of Simpson, by limiting G.E. to pat-
ented articles, is that a principal may set the price at which his agent
will sell the principal's patented products. However, the dissent in
Simpson felt that the majority overruled G.E. 377 U.S. at 29. Indicating
that Simpson may have overruled G.E. are Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 344 F.2d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 1965); CBS Business Equip. Corp.
v. -Underwood Corp., 240 F. Supp.- 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Lyons v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The
Court in Underwood indicated that it would hesitate to reach the con-
clusion, on the basis of Simpson, that a consignment contract involving
a patented article is legal per se under the Sherman Act.
39. Whether an agency relationship is not a defense to price-
fixing where the system is vast but no coercion is present is unclear
from the Court's opinion. Literally the opinion does not seem to indi-
cate that coercion is necessary. Justice Douglas said where the "con-
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no defense to a charge of price-fixing. Presumably, where the
distribution system is not vast, i.e., does not have the effects
present in Simpson, and the article involved is not patented, a
defense of agency is available.
The Schwinn case, as indicated above, is analogous to Simp-
son in that it impliedly rejected agency as a defense to price-
fixing. Schwinn distributed its bicycles by selling or consigning
them to distributors who sold them to retail dealers, or by the
"Schwinn plan" whereby Schwinn shipped the bicycles directly
to the dealer upon order of the distributor. The distributors
were authorized to sell only to franchised dealers in an assigned
territory. The franchised dealers were to sell only to consum-
ers. The Government alleged price-fixing, customer restrictions,
and territory allocation in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.
The district court 4° rejected the price-fixing charge. It held
that the territorial restrictions were illegal per se where imposed
upon buyers, but legal where placed upon agents or consignees.
In addition, it held that the customer restrictions were valid un-
der the Rule of Reason. The legality of the customer and terri-
torial restrictions was appealed by the United States. The Su-
preme Court ruled that territorial and customer restrictions
were illegal per se where the relationship was one of sale, but
that where the relationship was one of agency the Rule of Rea-
son should be applied. The Court thus held Schwinn's restric-
tions on purchasers illegal per se and those on its agents or
consignees protected by the Rule of Reason.
In applying the Rule of Reason to restraints on agents,
the Court necessarily rejected agency as an absolute defense.
Schwinn, unlike Simpson, made no distinction between patented
and unpatented products, but rather, as in G.E., found the
determinative factor to be the nature of the vertical relation-
ship. While in G.E. the Court determined illegality, in
Schwinn it determined the applicable standard of illegality.
signment device is used to cover a vast ... distribution system, fixing
prices through many retail outlets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the
'consignment' an agency." Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21
(1964). However, as indicated in the text, Justice Douglas, throughout
the majority opinion, emphasized the coercive effects of the arrange-
ment. It is possible that he did so, not as a reason to refuse to recognize
any agency relationship, but to show that prices had been coercively
maintained within the precepts of United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960).




Thus, Schwinn adds this much to the role of agency as a de-
fense in antitrust law: agency is not a defense to customer or
territorial restraints.
II. THE NATURE OF A VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP AS
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD
OF ILLEGALITY IN ANTITRUST CASES
It has been long recognized that price-fixing, horizontal4' or
vertical,42 is illegal per se. Likewise, it is well established that
horizontal division of territories43 and customers 44 is illegal per
se. However, the standard of illegality to be applied to vertical
customer and territorial restrictions was largely undetermined
prior to the Schwinn decision. In 1944 the Supreme Court stated
that vertical restrictions were illegal where price-fixing was an
"integral part of the whole distribution system,"45 and in 1963,
in White Motor Company v. United States,46 the Court indi-
cated vertical restrictions violated the Sherman Act where they
were "ancillary to the price fixing scheme."47
In White Motor, the Court refused to hold that vertical
customer and territorial restrictions, standing alone, were illegal
per se. The Court reversed the district court's4" summary judg-
ment holding of illegality per se on the ground that illegality
should be decided only after a trial as the Court knew too little
of the actual impact of the restrictions. Three dissenting mem-
bers of the Court contended that vertical restrictions should be
illegal per se.49
As had been previously noted, the Court in Schwinn ruled
that (1) vertical customer and territorial restrictions are illegal
41. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
42. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803 (6th Cir. 1908).
Vertical price-fixing can be legalized by state law pursuant to the
Miller-Tydings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
43. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Both
Addyston and Timken involved restraints in addition to market division.
44. United States v. Consolidated Launderies Corp., 291 F.2d 563,
574-75 (2d Cir. 1961).
45. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 720 (1944).
46. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
47. Id. at 260.
48. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio
1961).
49. Dissenting were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark and
Black. All three participated in the majority opinion in Schwinn.
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per se where the vertical relationship is one of sale, and (2)
that such restrictions are to be judged by a Rule of Reason where
the relationship is one of agency. Applying this ruling to the
facts, the Court held that Schwinn's territorial and customer
agreements with those to whom it sold bicycles were illegal
per se and that its agreements with those who were its agents
were protected by the Rule of Reason.
The adoption of the sale-agency distinction as the test of
the applicable standard of illegality was a return to the G.E.
emphasis on form, and a rejection of Simpson's focus upon the
impact of the restraint. While such an approach could lead to
a test of skill in draftsmanship, as was feared by Justice Doug-
las in Simpson and the Court in United States v. Masonite,50
the Schwinn opinion contained its own safeguard against such a
result. The Court made it clear that the Rule of Reason is to
be applied only where there is a pure agency, by stating that the
owner must retain "all indicia of ownership, including title, do-
minion and risk,"5' 1 so that the relationship has no elements of
sale. Moreover, the Court stated that the dealer must be indis-
tinguishable in position and function from that of an "agent or
salesman."5 2 By requiring that the restrictor retain all indicia of
ownership, the Court apparently denies Rule of Reason treatment
to relationships having elements of both sale and agency, as in
G.E.53 and Simpson.54  Thus the Court eliminated the long-stand-
ing judicial practice of balancing these elements55 and minimized
the opportunity for an ingenious draftsman to make a sale appear
to be an agency relationship. By requiring that the restricted be
indistinguishable, on the facts, from an agent or salesman the
Court indicated that it will examine the operation of the relation-
ship and not rely solely on the terms of the written instrument.5 6
50. 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
51. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381
(1967).
52. Id.
53. Note 13 supra lists those factors in G.E. which pointed to sale
and those which pointed to agency.
54. In Simpson the following indicia pointed to agency: Union
Oil paid all property taxes on gasoline in the consignee's possession;
title to the gas remained in Union Oil until sold by the consignee; and
the consignee dealt exclusively in Union Oil's gasoline. Pointing to sale
were the following: the consignee was required to carry personal lia-
bility and property damage insurance; was responsible for all losses of
gasoline, save acts of God; and was required to pay all costs of operation.
55. See note 13 supra.
56. The distributors who merited Rule of Reason treatment in
Schwinn were like salesmen. Schwinn directly shipped the bicycles to
19681
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Using the "purity" of the relationship to determine the ap-
plicable standard of illegality seems to be valid for the most part.
Certainly if a dealer is indistinguishable in function and position
from a salesman, i.e., is in effect the manufacturer's alter ego,
the manufacturer should be able to control his customers and
sales territory, as long as the restrictions are reasonable.t5  On
the other hand, where a relationship is clearly one of sale, the
interests of competition dictate that the purchaser have free
selection of customers and territories. Also, a per se rule seems
appropriate where a relationship has elements of both sale
and agency but is similar to that in Simpson where the con-
signees were actually small struggling competitors. 5 However,
it seems unfortunate that the Court has chosen to apply the
inflexible per se rule where a relationship has elements of
both sale and agency but the customer or territorial restrictions
are otherwise reasonable. For example, such restrictions may be
reasonable when only one element of sale is present as where
the relationship would be a "pure" agency except that the con-
signee delivers the goods rather than the consignor.
In addition to rejecting the sale-agency distinction as de-
terminative of the standard of illegality, Simpson, in contrast to
Schwinn, did not clearly indicate whether it applied a Rule of
Reason or a per se rule. Because Simpson emphasized the coer-
cive effects of company restrictions in Union Oil's vast system,
that the consignees were in effect struggling retail competitors,
and that price competition would have existed but for the price-
fixing agreements, it can be argued that the Court applied a
Rule of Reason. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Court
intended to overrule the long standing principle that price-fixing
is illegal per se.59 In fact, the Court refused to call the Union
Oil consignment an agency in order to prevent avoidance of the
result of United States v. Socony-Vacuum,60 a landmark per se
case.
Alternatively, it can be contended that the Simpson Court
set aside the per se rule of price-fixing only where agency rela-
tionships and restrictions involving nonpatented products exist.
the distributor's customer, invoiced the customer and extended credit
to the customer, while the distributor merely took the order and re-
ceived a commission from Schwinn for so doing.
57. As a practical matter it seems unlikely that customer and
territory restrictions imposed on agents would ever be unreasonable.
58. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964).
59. See notes 41 and 42 supra.
60. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1964).
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The difficulty with this proposition is that the Court in Simpson
at no point indicated that the relationship was an agency. Yet,
it is arguable that the Court would not have had to distinguish
G.E. or have been confronted with any difficult issue if it did not
strongly suspect that Union Oil had agency relationships with
its consignees. In any case, another problem with interpreting
Simpson as applying a Rule of Reason to an agency relationship,
is that Schwinn conflicts with this interpretation. In Simpson
the consignees were much more like independent businessmen
than salesmen. Therefore, Schwinn, in a vertical customer or
territorial restriction situation, would require application of a
per se rule to a Simpson type arrangement. It seems unlikely
that the Court intended to apply the Rule of Reason to price-
fixing which arises in a mixed sale-agency context, and yet
make customer and territorial restrictions illegal per se under
the same circumstances, since price fixing has always been con-
sidered more perniciously illegal than customer and territorial
restraints. While a converse rule might make some sense, the
Court by its opinion in Schwinn has eliminated such a possibility.
Thus, technically, it seems more likely that the Simpson
Court applied a per se rule of illegality than a Rule of Reason.
The Court's reason for discussing the coercive effect of the rela-
tionship may have been to justify its refusal to call the consign-
ment an agency.
From a practical standpoint, Simpson seems to use a two
step analysis. First, the Court applied a Rule of Reason to decide
if the arrangement should be recognized as an agency. When it
found that the effects of the Union Oil distribution system were
anti-competitive, it decided to ignore any agency relationship
and proceeded to apply a per se rule of illegality. The net effect
of this approach, of course, is the use of a Rule of Reason to
determine illegality. If the Court had found Union Oil's con-
signment arrangement to be reasonable, it would probably have
held an agency existed and treated this as a defense. As it found
the impact unreasonable, it refused to recognize the agency and
held the arrangement illegal. Thus, it appears illegality in a
Simpson situation depends on whether there is an unreasonable
anti-competitive effect.
III. THE FUTURE OF AGENCY IN ANTITRUST LAW
In conclusion, several observations may be made regarding
both the effect of Simpson and Schwinn on agency as a defense
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to vertical restraints on patented and unpatented products, and
the test of illegality to be applied to vertical restrictions.
Present law regarding agency as a defense to vertical re-
strictions requires distinguishing between price-fixing and other
vertical limitations. Moreover, when dealing with price-fixing,
a distinction must be made between commercial and individual
arrangements and between patented and unpatented products.
Schwinn, by holding customer and territorial restrictions subject
to a Rule of Reason analysis where a "pure" agency existed and
illegal per se in all other situations, necessarily rejected agency
as a defense to customer and territorial restrictions under all
circumstances.
Simpson, contrary to Schwinn, leaves open three situations
in which agency may be a defense to vertical price-fixing. First,
Simpson would allow an individual consigning an item to a busi-
ness to require that the item be sold only at the price the owner
sets. Justice Douglas said, "[o] ne who sends a rug or a painting
or other work of art to a merchant or a gallery for sale at a
minimum price can, of course, hold the consignee to the bar-
gain." 61
Secondly, Simpson would seem to allow agency as a de-
fense to price-fixing where the products upon which the price
is fixed are patented and the relationship between the supplier
and the seller is one of genuine agency (as in the G.E. situa-
tion). Although there is some doubt as to why only a patent
owner should be able to set the resale price of agents selling a
product he has produced, Simpson distinguished G.E. on patent
grounds and thus created this possibility. However, to take ad-
vantage of this defense the supplier must prove that the rela-
tionship is one of agency; he need not prove that it is a "pure"
agency as existed in Schwinn but merely that the relationship
is more like one of agency than sale.62
However, reliance on agency as a defense is inadvisable. It
seems probable that even if the price-fixing relates to patented
products, if the relationship is essentially one between separate
concerns and has effects similar to those existing in Simpson,
a court will avoid recognizing a defense of agency in an ambigu-
61. Id. at 18. This type of arrangement would most often be a
"pure" agency. However, the Simpson decision gave no significance to
such an observation.
62. In G.E. there were elements of both sale and agency. The
Court examined factors pointing to sale and agency and concluded that
the relationship was one of agency. Other cases have followed the same
approach. See note 13 supra.
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ous relationship by holding that the agreement, although purport-
ing to be an agency, was actually a sale. Moreover, when the
Supreme Court is confronted with restraints on patented prod-
ucts and effects like those in Simpson, it may well ignore its
G.E. patent distinction. Such a result seems likely in view of the
Court's omission of any patent distinction in the Schwinn case,
and the fact that the patent rationale makes little sense.
Thus, reliance on G.E. seems treacherous.
The third context in which Simpson seems to indicate
agency may be a defense to vertical price-fixing is where the
price maintenance does not have the adverse effects on com-
petition present in Simpson. The Simpson Court, by stating that
where certain factors are present the "antitrust laws prevent
calling the consignment an agency," 63 implied that where such
effects are not present, a consignment may be called an agency,
and, presumably, a defense to price-fixing. One seeking to use
this defense must show that an agency relationship exists and
that anti-competitive effects are not present. This may be diffi-
cult in view of the Court's demonstration in Schwinn that it
will be tough on vertical restrictions and apparently will never
recognize agency as a defense to customer and territorial re-
straints.
What the Court will do with price-fixing on an unpatented
product in a "pure" agency relationship is unclear. However,
it seems likely that in view of the Court's decision in Schwinn
to apply the Rule of Reason approach to such relationships
when the question is vertical customer and territorial restric-
tions, the Court will not allow "pure" agency as a defense to
vertical price-fixing.
Thus, while Schwinn necessarily implied that agency is not a
defense to vertical customer and territorial restrictions, Simpson
leaves open the possibility that agency may be a defense to
price-fixing on patented products and to price-fixing on unpat-
ented products where anti-competitive effects present in Simpson
do not exist.
Just as Schwinn and Simpson seem to differ on the question
of agency as a defense, they also appear to differ in a practical
sense on the standard of illegality to be applied. Technically,
Simpson applied a per se rule of illegality to a mixed sale-agency
relationship, and Schwinn indicated that it would apply a per se
rule to this same relationship by stating that those relationships
63. 377 U.S. at 21.
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in which the agent is not identical in function to a salesman
will be judged by a per se rule. Realistically, however, Simpson
applied a Rule of Reason. Since the impact of the relationship
in Simpson determined whether or not the Court would recognize
the consignment as an agency, it in effect also determined the
legality of the arrangement. If the Court had found that the
effects were not anti-competitive, presumably it would have rec-
ognized the agency, and on the basis of G.E., held the price-
fixing legal. Instead, the Court found the effects of the price-
fixing uncompetitive and refused to call the "consignment"
an agency.
As to the "pure" agency relationship, the Schwinn Court
clearly stated that a Rule of Reason will be applied. What the
Court will do in a "pure" agency price-fixing situation is uncer-
tain. The door is open for it to treat "pure" agency as a de-
fense to price-fixing or to apply either a Rule of Reason or per se
test to it.
Thus, Simpson and Schwinn are difficult to reconcile. Simp-
son seems to leave room for a defense of agency while Schwinn
does not. Moreover, the two cases suggest that different stand-
ards of illegality will be applied to ambiguous vertical rela-
tionships. However, it seems probable that as the law develops
the Court will bring Simpson in line with Schwinn. The trend
of the Court is toward a more critical view of vertical restric-
tions. Both Simpson and Schwinn narrowed the agency de-
fense of G.E.; Simpson by refusing to recognize the defense
where there was an anti-competitive impact and the product
involved was unpatented, Schwinn by eliminating agency
as a defense and by holding that at most a "pure" agency
merited a Rule of Reason approach while all other relationships
were to receive per se treatment. Moreover, the Court's strin-
gent attitude toward customer and territorial restrictions and
restraints, generally considered to be less undesirable than price-
fixing, seems to indicate the Court will be at least equally severe
on price-fixing.
64. The United States has filed a complaint against General Elec-
tric alleging that G.E. has illegally fixed the prices at which its con-
signees sell lamps. United States v. General Elec. Co., Civil No. 663118
(S.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 27, 1966). The Government is taking the position
that the old G.E. case no longer reflects the law.
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Notes
Dollar Amount "Specific Portion" for Estate
Tax Savings-Drafting in the Alternative
to Insure Maximum Marital Deduction*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
for the allowance of a marital deduction from the decedent's
gross estate "equal to the value of any interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse
.... The amount available for deduction is limited to 50
per cent of the adjusted gross estate,2 and the phrase "interest in
property" includes a life estate coupled with a power of ap-
pointment.3 One form the life estate may take is a trust entitling
the surviving spouse4 "to all the income from the entire in-
terest .. .or ... a specific portion thereof, payable annually
or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion.
...". The Treasury Regulations define "specific portion" re-
* This Note has been entered in the 1969 Estate Planning Com-
petition sponsored by the First National Bank of Chicago.
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056 (a).
2. Id., § 2056 (c) (I).
3. Id., § 2056(b) (5).
4. The marital deduction is available to either husband or wife.
However, for convenience, this Note will frequently refer to the surviv-
ing spouse as the "widow."
5. INT. Rpv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5). Stated in full the sec-
tion reads:
(5) LIFE ESTATE WITH POWER OF APPOINTMENT IN
SURVIVING SPOUSE-In the case of an interest in property
passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for
life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income
from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more
frequent intervals, with power in the surviving spouse to ap-
point the entire interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in
favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such sur-
viving spouse, or in favor of either, whether or not in each case
the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no
power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest, or
such specific portion, to any person other than the surviving
spouse-(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall,
for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to
the surviving spouse, and (B) no part of the interest so
passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1) (A), be consid-
ered as passing to any person other than the surviving
spouse.
This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion
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strictively, requiring its expression as "a fractional or percentile
share of a property interest"6 before it can qualify as an inter-
est to be deducted.
In recent years, the Treasury's definition has been success-
fully attacked in the lower courts because of the limitations it
places on the availability of the marital deduction.7 This opposi-
tion has recently reached the Supreme Court, which held that
the "Regulation improperly restricts the scope of the congression-
ally granted deduction."s This Note will examine the judicial
rejection of the Treasury's definition of "specific portion," and
recommend changes in that definition which conform with the
Supreme Court's apparent present position. Also, an attempt
will be made to outline alternative trust provisions which take
account of the recent decisions and minimize potential estate tax
liability, while at the same time insuring the qualification of the
maximum marital deduction.
II. BACKGROUND
The marital deduction was developed to deal with the dis-
parity between common-law and community property states with
respect to marital property rights.9 The community property
states place half the interest in property held in the community
thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable
by such spouse alone and in all events.
6. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958). The pertinent portion
of the regulation reads:
(c) DEFINITION OF "SPECIFIC PORTION." A partial inter-
est in property is not treated as a specific portion of the entire
interest unless the rights of the surviving spouse in income and
as to the power constitute a fractional or percentile share of a
property interest so that such interest or share in the surviving
spouse reflects its proportionate share of the increment or de-
cline in the whole of the property interest to which the income
rights and the power relate. Thus, if the right of the spouse to
income and the power extend to one-half or a specified per-
centage of the property, or the equivalent, the interest is con-
sidered as a specific portion. On the other hand, if the annual
income of the spouse is limited to a specific sum, or if she has a
power to appoint only a specific sum out of a larger fund, the
interest is not a deductible interest.
7. See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th
Cir. 1966); Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); Allen v.
United States, 250 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
8. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387
U.S. 213 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Northeastern].
9. See H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1948);
S. REP. No. 1012, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-29 (1948); Sugarman, Estate and




estate0 in each spouse, regardless of relative responsibility for
its accumulation 1 ' or the name in which title is taken. Thus,
when one spouse dies, only his half of the community estate will
be included in his estate for tax purposes. The common law
states, on the other hand, place property in the estate of the
spouse holding title-in most instances the husband. The result,
absent the marital deduction, is an estate tax on the property at
the husband's death, and, if the property passes to the widow,
again on her death.
The marital deduction first appeared in the Revenue Act of
1948.12 As originally enacted, the statute did not present the
problem of a "specific portion" since it only allowed marital de-
ductions for trusts which entitled the surviving spouse to "all
the income" and the power to appoint the "entire corpus" at
death.'3 This language was construed to disqualify trusts which
granted the spouse only a portion of the income and a power to
appoint a portion of the corpus.14 However, there was no justifi-
cation for requiring separate trusts for the wife and children
as was necessary under the original section, and in 1954, Congress
liberalized this provision by allowing a spouse to receive all
the income from a "specific portion" of a trust with a power to
appoint "such specific portion."'1
Since the amendment, the Treasury Regulations have re-
quired that the "specific portion" be expressed in fractional or
percentile terms in order to assure that the "share in the sur-
viving spouse reflect its proportionate share of the increment
or decline in the whole of the property interest to which the
income rights and the power relate."'16 The Treasury's position
10. The community estate generally consists of all property, real
or personal, acquired by a husband or a wife during their marriage
except for that acquired by gift, descent or devise. 4 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 676-77 (1967).
11. C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs 369
(2d ed. 1962).
12. INT. REv. CODE of 1948, § 361, added by ch. 108, § 361, 62
Stat. 117, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123.
13. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 812(e) (1) (F), as amended, Revenue
Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117.
14. See, e.g., Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957); Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
15. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5).
16. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5(c) (1958). "That is, that both the
government and the surviving spouse share equally in the risk of the
property decreasing in value (and thus the ultimate tax decreasing) and
of the property increasing in value (and thus the ultimate tax increas-
ing)." Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235
F. Supp. 941, 945 (D. Pa. 1965).
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finds support in the Senate Report on the 1954 Amendment
which stated that "a right to income plus a general power of
appointment over only an undivided part of the property will
qualify that part of the property for the marital deduction."' 7
Also, the only example given in the House and Senate Reports
is expressed in terms of a fractional share.'8 It is argued that
"undivided" most frequently refers to fractional or percentile
portions rather than specified amounts, 9 and that the use of a
fraction in the example indicates congressional intent to define
"specific portion" as a fractional share.
Although the Treasury has attempted to limit the use of the
"specific portion" provisions of section 2056, the courts have been
reluctant to accept this restrictive treatment. Geib v. Commis-
sioner20 was the first case to reject the Treasury Regulation's
definition. The Commissioner attempted to deny the deductibil-
ity of a trust, which granted the widow a power of appointment
over the entire trust principal, on the ground that trustees were
granted the right to invade the trust corpus for up to $5000 per
year to provide for the support and education of a daughter.
The Second Circuit determined that the widow's power extended
over the entire trust less the value of the maximum yearly inva-
sion multiplied by the joint expectancies of the widow and the
daughter.21 While recognizing that this formula creates a dis-
proportionate risk to the widow in case of trust appreciation, 22
the court contended that Congress spoke in terms of a specific
portion rather than a fractional or percentile share, and did not
intend the validity of the marital deduction to depend on whether
17. S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954). The House
Report contains substantially the same language. H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954).
18. For example, if the decedent in his will provided for the
creation of a trust under the terms of which the income from
one-half of the trust property is payable to the surviving spouse
with uncontrolled power in the spouse to appoint such one-half
of the trust property by will, such interest will qualify ...
S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 475 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A319 (1954).
19. See Covey, New Doctrines on Marital Deductions, 101 T. & E.
322, 392 n.15 (1962).
20. 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
21. The court pointed out that "the use of actuarial tables for
dealing with estate tax problems has been so widespread and of such
long standing that we cannot assume Congress would have balked at it
here; the law of averages has ample opportunity to work." Id. at
551-52.
22. The Gelb court points out that any increase in value of the
entire trust will be taxed to the widow's share, including that increase
attributable to other shares. Id. at 550.
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the widow's portion shared the risk of a value change in the
trust corpus. Arguing that the marital deduction was designed
to reduce discrimination against taxpayers in non-community
property states and to permit inclusion of certain normal testa-
mentary dispositions without total forfeiture of the deduction, 2
3
the court found that the fractional interest example in the
House and Senate Reports did not foreclose other instances
"fairly within the language and the underlying policy. '24 The
tax consequence of depreciation of Gelb-type trust assets raises
the possibility of estate tax avoidance. If the trust corpus were
to decrease in value, the widow's share would absorb all losses
and her estate taxes would be lowered accordingly. Of course,
any appreciation in the trust corpus will be included in the
widow's share and will be taxed to her estate at her death.25
Thus, Gelb seems to allow a testator to speculate as to the future
value of assets he will place in a marital deduction trust that
is subject to invasion. If he guesses correctly, the widow's estate
taxes will be lowered.
The elements of disproportionate risk and possible estate
tax avoidance that Gelb appears to allow would not be possible
in a community property state where the widow's estate is a
fractional share and reflects only its own gains and losses.
Thus, Gelb can be criticized for failure to promote equalization
of tax treatment between common law and community property
jurisdictions. 2 But the Gelb result does advance Congress's
"underlying policy" of allowing certain normal property disposi-
tions without complete loss of the deduction. Also, in a time of
rising market values, a Gelb trust will result in more estate taxes
than a fractional share trust,27 and it seems unlikely that a
trustee would fail to replace those assets decreasing in value
simply because of the greater possible loss deduction. Thus, the
testator should probably be allowed to assume the disproportion-
ate risk without losing the marital deduction.28
23. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1962).
24. Id.
25. E.g., A trust corpus valued at $100,000 with an excluded amount
of $50,000. If the trust were to decrease $50,000 in value prior to the
widow's death, there would be nothing to include in her estate. On
the other hand, if the total trust value increased to $150,000, $100,000
would be included in her estate.
26. See Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 468, 476 (1967).
27. See Covey, supra note 19, at 392.
28. Id.; see Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction: A Procrustean
Bed of Complexities, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 319, 326 (1965); Comment,
2 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 107, 110-11 (1967). But see Note, 19 STAN. L.
Rv. 468, 476 (1967).
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Since Gelb, two other circuit courts have dealt with the
"specific portion" issue.2 9 However, the most significant case in
the area is Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank & Trust
Company v. United States,30 a recent Supreme Court decision.
There, the widow was given the right to a $300 monthly income
with a power to appoint the entire corpus at death. The circuit
court had disallowed the deduction on the ground that there were
too many variables involved to accurately compute the specific
portion.1' The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
Mr. Covey argues that the Treasury's main concern is with a power
over a specific dollar amount as opposed to a power over the entire
trust less a dollar amount. In the former situation, the marital portion,
unlike the portion subject to taxes, is unaffected by gain or loss whereas
in the latter the marital share does "share equally" in the increases and
decreases of the trust principal. Of course, the marital share in the
Gelb situation is also absorbing the increases and losses from the
dollar amount exclusion which accentuates its allowable loss deductions
as well as its taxable gains.
29. In Allen v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Mo. 1965),
the widow had a right to the income from the trust for life but no power
of appointment over the corpus. She did, however, have the right to
receive on demand $5000 annually from the corpus. The court allowed
the marital deduction contending that $5000 is "specific" as defined by
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1571 (4th ed. 1951), and that the Govern-
ment's position as to the fractional requirement had been rejected by
every court which had examined the problem.
In Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966),
the widow was granted the right to a monthly payment of $200 with a
power of appointment over the entire corpus. The issue, simplified by
the government's concession that a dollar amount could be a "specific
portion," was whether she had the right to "all the income" from a
specific portion" of the trust. Id. at 820 n.8. The court allowed the
marital deduction in an amount which, at 3 % interest, would yield
$200 per month income, relying on Gelb's rejection of the Government's
arguments as to the uncertainties involved in actuarial computations
and the acceptance of Gelb in the district court decision of the North-
eastern case.
30. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
31. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 363 F.2d 476, 482-84
(2d Cir. 1966). The District Court had allowed the marital deduction in
an amount computed actuarially by an annuity valuation, relying on the
Gelb rejection of the fractional requirement and acceptance of actuarial
tables in computing the value of the marital deduction. Northeastern
Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941, 946 (D. Pa.
1965). The Circuit Court did not reject the Gelb reasoning as to the
specific portion requirement, but did reject the annuity-valuation com-
putation of the amount. It argued that the annuity computation neces-
sarily results in dissipation of the fund, a factor not contemplated by the
testator, and that the monthly payment figure arrived at by application
of the actuarial formula does not represent pure income as claimed, but
rather, income plus any trust principal necessary to make the payment.
The court also referred to variable market investment conditions,
which would dictate the necessity for trust principal invasions, as well
as the power to invade the corpus for illness and financial emergencies
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that the specific portion need not always be expressed as a frac-
tional or percentile amount. It rejected the circuit court's view
as to the impossibility of computing the marital share, but agreed
that an annuity-valuation computation was incorrect.32
While recognizing that the underlying purpose of the marital
deduction is to equalize the incidence of estate taxation in com-
munity property and common law jurisdictions,33 the Northeast-
ern Court noted that the statute did not pretend to equalize all
the qualitative ownership aspects of the two property systems.34
The legislative history of section 2056 indicates congressional
willingness to recognize "customary modes of transfer of prop-
erty in common law States,"35 and the Court accepts this liberal
involving both the widow and the children. It has been argued that
this latter factor, by itself, should have been sufficient grounds for re-jection of the deduction since invasion of the trust corpus for each emer-
gency would detract from the required exclusive power in the widow.
Comment, 15 KAN. L. REV. 204, 206 (1966). This issue was never raised.
See Comment, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 250, 252 n.17 (1967).
32. The Court, citing Gelb, pointed out that "the use of projected
rates of return in the administration of the federal tax laws is hardly
an innovation." Northeastern at 224. The Court, however, did agree
with the circuit court's condemnation of the annuity-valuation ap-
proach and indicated that the proper method would be to determine
the amount of corpus needed to produce the monthly payments. Id. at
224 n.15.
33. Northeastern at 219.
34. Id. The relationship between community property and com-
mon law jurisdictions as regards the marital deduction has been dis-
cussed in terms of qualitative and quantitative similarities and differ-
ences. See Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under
the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Community
Property States, 54 MlcH. L. REv. 1087, 1104 (1956); Note, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 468 (1967). The surviving spouse in the community propertyjurisdiction has the absolute right to one-half the property and this
ownership right is a qualitative factor. Any interest less than outright
ownership (e.g., a life estate in a trust), held by the surviving spouse
in a common law jurisdiction, would thus automatically create qualita-
tive inequality between the two jurisdictions. Quantitative inequality,
on the other hand, would result from disparity in the incidence of es-
tate taxes between the two types of jurisdictions.
Some of the "inherent" variances between the two property systems
are: (1) the goal of dividing the estate equally between husband and
wife can only be achieved in common law jurisdictions when the hus-
band owns all the property; (2) in common law states an annuity can
be designed that will avoid estate taxes on both the husband's and wife's
estates, but this is not available in community property jurisdictions;
(3) there will frequently be double probate and death duties in common
law jurisdictions since they are levied on the entire estate at the death
of each spouse; (4) in common law jurisdictions the assets intended for
the marital deduction can include those that are considered "wasting."
See Anderson supra.




attitude as the touchstone of its decision.30 As in Gelb, the
Northeastern Court found no evidence in the legislative history
that would dictate disqualification of a marital trust "merely"
because the specific portion was not in fractional or percentile
terms.37 On the contrary, the Court stated that the intent of
Congress was to afford liberal "'estate-splitting' possibilities to
married couples," and that it was plain "such a provision should
not be construed so as to impose unwarranted restrictions upon
the availability of the deduction."38
When confined to its facts, Northeastern's rejection of the
Treasury's definition of "specific portion" can be supported.
Since the widow's power of appointment extends over the entire
trust, there is no danger of any quantitative variance between
this beneficiary and her counterpart in a community property
state. Her taxable estate will include the entire trust corpus at
her death even though her income rights are limited to the
monthly payment.39 Although the legislative history of the frac-
tional or percentile requirement can be read to support the
Treasury's interpretation, 40 the Court was concerned here with
the fact that a trust provision, specifically allowed by statute
(even though qualitatively less restrictive than the typical com-
munity property interest), would result in the complete loss of
the marital deduction "merely" because not expressed in frac-
tional or percentile terms. The spouse would be deprived of
36. Some of the technical arguments against allowing a monthly
sum to be capitalized, and thus qualify as specific portion, are the
uncertainty that "all the income" from the dollar amount will be neces-
sary to make the payment and the uncertainty that the estimated rate
of return will stay constant in the future. The court made short shrift
of these arguments by citing the Gelb language, see note 21 supra, as to
the widespread judicial use of actuarial tables. Northeastern at 224.
37. In answer to the Government's argument that the example
used in the Senate and House Reports was in fractional terms and
thus indicated Congressional intent, the Court observed: "[O]bviously
this example was not intended to limit the meaning of the new lan-
guage." Northeastern at 221 n.1.
38. Northeastern at 221. The Government had also argued that the
legislative history requires the interest of the surviving spouse to be vir-
tually equivalent to outright ownership and that only a fractional or
percentile share would carry with it the value fluctuation risks normally
incident to ordinary ownership. The Court dismissed this argument as
"simply irrelevant," pointing out that the "virtual owner" language was
used only for the purpose of prohibiting anyone other than the surviving
spouse to have any power over the trust income or corpus. Id. at 222.
39. INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a) (2). This section essentially
provides that property over which the widow has a general power of
appointment at her death will be included in her estate.
40. See Covey, supra note 19, at 392 & n.15.
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any benefit from the marital deduction, a narrow result which
the Court felt was not warranted by common sense, the statute,
or its history.41
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF NORTHEASTERN
Although Northeastern does approve an estate planning
method whereby the testator can provide his widow with equal
monthly payments after his death while retaining the benefits of
the marital deduction, 42 the real significance of the case lies in
the likelihood, pointed to by the dissent, of tax avoidance possibil-
ities. 43 Since the majority allowed a monthly payment require-
ment to be capitalized to determine the dollar amount of the
specific portion, the dissent saw no good reason not to do away
with future capitalization computations altogether by simply al-
lowing the settlor to limit his spouse to a specified dollar amount
of corpus.44  However, the dissent argues that once a dollar
amount specific portion is allowed where the power is over the
entire trust corpus, a dollar amount specific portion where the
power to appoint is limited to the dollar amount will also have
to be permitted. This argument is supported by the language of
the Code to the effect that the surviving spouse need only have
the right to "all the income from . . . a specific portion ...
with power in the surviving spouse to appoint... such specific
portion '45 in order to qualify for the deduction. The dissent
does not see how it is possible to read "a specific portion" as not
referring to "such specific portion." Thus the "specific portion"
referred to in connection with income rights must necessarily be
identical to that referred to in connection with the power of ap-
pointment.46
41. Northeastern at 221-22.
42. The widow's estate will be taxed on any appreciation of the
trust corpus in both cases. Thus, the only practical difference between
a Northeastern trust and one expressed in fractional or percentile terms
is the greater control available to the testator in the former. The widow
will receive all the income from the fractional share, but with a North-
eastern trust the testator is able to limit her receipt of income to a pre-
arranged amount.
43. Northeastern at 227 (dissenting opinion).
44. The only difference between a trust which gives the wife
income from a fixed amount of corpus and the one the Court
has before it today is that the former does not require capital-
izing a stream of payments into a lump sum, since it defines the
sum at the outset.
Northeastern at 226 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
45. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5) (emphasis added).
46. Northeastern at 227 (dissenting opinion). The dissent illus-
trates this result by the following hypothetical situation: Assume a
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While the logic of the dissent's argument is strong, it is not
clear that the majority intended its holding to be read so
broadly. The Court noted that, in addition to jurisdictional
equalization, the purpose of the marital deduction is to permit
a married couple's property to be taxed in two stages, not to
allow a wholly tax-free transfer to the succeeding generation.47
The Court referred to the liberal "estate-splitting" intent behind
the statute, designed, in part, for cases "where the deductible
half of the decedent's estate would ultimately-if not consumed
-be taxable in the estate of the survivor. . . ,"48 The majority
was careful to point out that the Regulation improperly re-
stricted the congressional intent only in the context of that
case,49 and emphasized that there would be no chance of any of
the husband and wife's combined estate escaping ultimate taxa-
tion.50 Although the Government apparently did not argue the
case posed by the dissent5' as a possible ramification of this de-
cision, it did argue that Gelb facts as an example of possible es-
tate tax avoidance. The Court cautiously avoided any comment
on the validity of this argument, stating that it was a "quite
different problem" and not in issue in the Northeastern case.52
Since Gelb, like Northeastern, did involve the question of a dol-
lar amount interest qualifying as a "specific portion," this
reasoning is supportable only because in Northeastern there was
no possibility of tax avoidance.
The weight which the Court gives to the presence or ab-
sence of potential tax avoidance is clearly demonstrated by com-
paring Northeastern to Commissioner v. Bosch,53 handed down
fourteen days after Northeastern. Both Bosch and Northeastern
involve the qualification of an interest for the marital deduction,
trust estate of $200,000, with the widow receiving the right to the income
from $100,000 of its corpus and a power of appointment over that
$100,000, and the children of the testator receiving income from the
balance of the corpus during the widow's life, their remainders to vest
when she dies. Now suppose that when the widow dies the trust corpus
has doubled in value to $400,000. The wife's power of appointment over
$100,000 applies only to make $100,000 taxable to her estate. The re-
maining $300,000 passes tax free to the children. Id. at 227 n.2.
47. Id. at 219, citing United States v. Staph, 375 U.S. 118, 128
(1963). See also Doughtery v. United States, 292 F.2d 331, 337 (6th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Crosby, 257 F.2d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 1958);
Pipe v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 99, 104, a-'ffd, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957).
48. Northeastern at 221.
49. Id. at 218.
50. Id. at 224.
51. See note 46, supra.
52. Northeastern at 225.
53. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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but Bosch, unlike Northeastern, adopts a narrow construction of
the marital deduction section.5 4 In that case, the Court, in a
marital deduction context, held that the federal courts are bound
for federal tax purposes by state probate court decisions regard-
ing the character of property interests. The Bosch Court recog-
nized the importance of eliminating tax avoidance possibilities,
noting that Code sections 2056(b), (c), and (d) "indicate .. .a
definite concern with the elimination of loop-holes and escape
hatches that might jeopardize the federal revenue." 55  The
common denominator in both cases is the basic requirement that
none of the combined estate escapes ultimate taxation. Thus,
both cases can be viewed as supporting a single policy regarding
the marital deduction: a liberal construction of the provision
so long as it does not create tax avoidance possibilities.
Against this background of expressed willingness to allow a
marital deduction only if it will not result in tax avoidance, it
seems unlikely the dissent's hypothetical case of a power over
only a dollar amount interest would be allowed to qualify for
deduction.58 Yet, as the dissent points out, once a dollar amount
54. Id. at 464.
55. Id.
56. Another area that demonstrates the willingness of Congress to
encourage estate-splitting is the "estate trust." The Regulations mus-
trate this marital deduction interest with the following example: "the
trust income is payable to W for life and upon her death the corpus
is distributable to her executors or administrators." Treas. Reg. §
20.2056 (e) -2 (b) (1) i) (1958). Her interest is not terminable under
§ 2056(b) (1) since no other person has an interest, but the incidents of
ownership are even less than those of the trust with a power of ap-
pointment.
Casner refers to the "estate trust" as the case where the wife and
her estate are the "sole beneficiaries under the trust." 1 A. CASNER,
ESTATE PLANNGNG 840 (3d ed. 1961). But, in Commissioner v. Ellis,
252 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 1958), the court allowed a deduction when the
widow had a limited power to invade, with half the corpus going to her
estate on her death and the other half to her children. The Govern-
ment argued that her entire interest became terminable because it was a
shared interest and the other portion was terminable. The court re-jected this:
Thus, although for the disallowance of the marital deduction
there must be a sharing of the terminable interest, it cannot be
said properly that because the widow shares an interest in the
whole corpus of a trust that this alone can make a severable
non-terminable interest terminable.
Id. The example used in support of this statement was taken from S. REP.
No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 336 (1948), which states: "[I]f the
decedent by his will devises Blackacre to his wife and son as tenants
in common, the marital deduction is allowed, since the surviving spouse's
interest is not a terminable interest."
If use of the "estate trust" for maritable deduction purposes is ex-
tended beyond the case where the widow is sole beneficiary, it would
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does qualify as a "specific portion," it is difficult to escape the
tax avoidance possibility under a literal reading of the statute.
To limit Northeastern to its facts, thus precluding any tax
avoidance, a distinction must be drawn between the income re-
quirements and the power requirements of the specific portion. 57
One somewhat technical argument which supports this dis-
tinction is based on the Code language limiting the qualification
of a life estate with power of appointment in the surviving
spouse to those cases where the power is exercisable by the
spouse "alone and in all events."58 A power of appointment lim-
ited to a specified dollar amount specific portion would not be
exercisable "in all events" because the trust might decrease in
value below the level of the specific dollar amount at which time
the power, as granted, would not be exercisable. 59 If the wife
has a power to appoint all, or a fraction, of the corpus and it
decreases to zero, there is arguably the same situation. But in
this latter case, there is no literal inconsistency in speaking of
her power over all, or a fraction of the corpus whether it is
zero or $100,000. In the former case, there is a literal incon-
sistency in saying she has the power, in all events, to appoint
$100,000 when, in fact, there is not $100,000 to appoint.60 There
appear that the same problems will arise as in cases involving power-
over-a-dollar-amount trusts. Although the share in Ellis is expressed in
fractional terms and the example uses tenancy in common, there is no
expressed disapproval of specifying the widow's share in an "estate
trust" as a dollar amount, thus allowing any appreciation to pour into
the terminable interest portion. In order to avoid the revenue loss, it
seems the Court would have to limit this type of interest to one ex-
pressed in fractional terms.
57. See Comment, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 250, 253 (1967).
58. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5). The applicable portion
reads:
This paragraph shall apply only if such power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion
thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable
by such spouse alone and in all events.
59. The opinion has been expressed, see Covey, supra note 19, at
393, that this would not operate to disqualify the deduction. This is
based on an analogy to a term for years charitable donation where the
guaranteed annual rate is higher than the rate in the actuarial tables.
Apparently, the Treasury has not questioned such a deduction, even
though the principal might decrease to the point where payments could
no longer be made. Technically, however, the "all events" argument
against the dollar amount is sound and is reinforced by strong policy
considerations. Thus, it could be used if the Court were looking for a
way to avoid the literal language of the statute.
60. The marital deduction has frequently been denied for failure to
meet a strict "all events" test. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ellis, 252 F.2d
109 (3d Cir. 1958) (spouse given unlimited power to invade principal
but state law limited power to reasonable use); Matteson v. United
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is no guarantee of value when an amount is expressed as "all"
or a fraction, however, there is such guarantee when it is ex-
pressed by a value.
The above argument provides a logically satisfactory distinc-
tion between the income "specific portion" and the power of
appointment "specific portion." In addition, it is consistent with
the desire of the Northeastern majority to promote "liberal 'es-
tate-splitting' possibilities" in order to equalize tax consequences
while guarding against situations which will jeopardize the fed-
eral revenue. The espousal of this distinction would constitute
judicial rewriting of the Regulation to permit the income from
a dollar-amount "specific portion" to qualify for the marital de-
duction only when the power is over the entire corpus.6 1 The
Court would be justified in taking this step due to the im-
portance of equalizing the incidence of estate tax between com-
munity property and common law jurisdictions, giving effect to
the customary modes of property transfer in common law states,62
and preventing tax exempt transfer of wealth into succeeding
generations.
68
While the "all events" test, buttressed by the policy consid-
erations described above, would disqualify the power-over-a-
dollar-amount interest, it would not change the Gelb situation
where the power is over the entire corpus less a dollar amount.
Although the "all events" test is satisfied, any depreciation of
the trust corpus, including that attributable to the excluded por-
tion, will result in a smaller estate and consequently a smaller
States, 147 F. Supp. 535 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 240 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1956)
(power to invade principal if income insufficient held to require good
faith determination of insufficiency); Estate of Noble, 31 T.C. 888 (1959)
(discretionary power in the beneficiary to invade corpus for maintenance,
support and comfort held restrictive); Estate of Comer, 31 T.C. 1193(1959) (power to invade principal for maintenance, comfort and general
welfare not an unlimited power); In re Estate of Gramm, 420 Pa. 510,
218 A.2d 342 (1966) (full power of consumption over principal limited
by widow's judgment as to her needs). See generally 1 A. CASNEP,
ESTATE PLANNNG 846-51, 846 n.128 (3d ed. 1961); Id. at 691-99 (Supp.
1967).
61. The distinction could be incorporated into the "specific por-
tion" definition as follows:
A partial interest expressed by fractional or percentile share
shall be qualified for deduction so long as the surviving spouse
has the requisite income rights and a power to appoint such
share. A partial interest in property, ascertainable in amount,
will qualify as a "specific portion" so long as the power over
the portion which is expressed other than by fractional or
percentile share shall extend over the entire property interest.
62. Northeastern at 219.
63. United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 129 (1963).
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estate tax upon the death of the trust beneficiary. The North-
eastern majority was very careful to avoid giving any opinion
as to the validity of the Gelb result, confining its approval to
Gelb's rejection of the Government's argument that the frac-
tional requirement was necessary in order to make the surviving
spouse's share subject to economic fluctuations, and its acceptance
of actuarial principles in determining the amount of the share.
But this is not the obvious case of tax avoidance posed by the
Northeastern dissent, nor indeed is tax avoidance likely.64 The
testator's purpose in creating a Gelb trust cannot be faulted
since this vehicle may reduce costs and allow the widow to re-
ceive the maximum income while still providing for any needs
of the children. This could be done with two separate trusts, but
a single instrument, which balances the disadvantage 5 of a
disproportionate risk of excessive taxes against the advantages
of equalization of tax treatment and the relative remoteness of
the possibility of a loss in revenue, may well be more appropriate.
There is no need to disallow the deduction and require two
separate trusts in such a situation.
IV. DRAFTING IN THE ALTERNATIVE
The potential estate tax savings from the power-over-a-
dollar-amount provision, when considered in light of the uncer-
tainty as to its tax treatment, creates problems for the estate
planner. He must strive to take full advantage of the potential
tax savings, while insuring a maximum marital deduction if the
power-over-a-dollar-amount provision fails to qualify. One way
to accomplish these objectives is to use a clause containing al-
ternative provisions.66 The discussion below will consider sev-
eral such clauses, each containing: (1) a "power-over-a-dollar-
amount provision" and (2) an "assured-marital-deduction" pro-
64. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
65. Of course, the single trust is not always preferable to multiple
trusts. There are many independent factors that would affect any con-
venient estimate. See Lovell, Marital Deduction Simplified, 93 T. & E.
760 (1954).
66. There are, of course, situations where the courts could salvage
the marital deduction even though a power-over-a-dollar-amount provi-
sion did not qualify. An example would be a power-over-a-dollar-
amount trust where the dollar amount equaled the total value of the
trust assets. If the dollar amount were deemed non-qualifying, a
court could find that there is simply a power over the entire corpus and
no actual specific portion involved. The argument is double-edged,
however, since it might be used to limit tax avoidance if the power-over-
a-dollar-amount provision is found to be valid. See Covey, supra note
19, at 393 n.21.
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vision to become operative in case of failure of the first. Before
specific clauses are discussed, however, it is necessary to consider
possible objections to the use of alternative drafting in the mari-
tal deduction context.
The first hurdle for provisions drafted in the alternative
is found in section 2056(b) (1) which allows no deduction for an
interest that will "terminate or fail" upon the "occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contin-
gency to occur. . . ." Because the "assured-marital-deduction"
provision would only be needed if the power-over-a-dollar-
amount portion did not qualify, the former provision might be
disqualified because it is subject to a contingency. If this hap-
pened, and the power-over-a-dollar-amount provision was then
determined non-qualifying, the entire marital deduction would be
lost. However, this result is neither warranted by the purpose of
the terminable interest rule nor consistent with the contingencies
intended to be disqualifying. The purpose of the terminable in-
terest rule is essentially to "preserve the parallel between the
marital deduction and community property jurisdictions" 67 by
denying the deduction to a limited interest in property which
passes to the surviving spouse but "which will not be taxable to
her estate at her death."'63 The only contingency in that case is
the amount of the share that qualifies for the marital deduction.
The Regulations speak of the life estate, term for years, annuity,
patents and copyrights as examples of interests that will termi-
nate.0 1 But, in the proposed alternative provisions, any interest
she does get will pass through her estate and the only thing that
needs to be determined is the amount. There is no danger that
the interest she will receive will escape taxation in her estate.
Also, this type of contingency is commonplace in the marital de-
duction formula gift context where the funding of a marital de-
duction formula trust depends on whether other specific interests
will qualify for the deduction. Thus, while there is still a possi-
ble blanket contingency objection, it should not prevail.
A second hurdle for a clause containing alternative drafting
provisions is the objection that such a clause forces the court to
construe the will and to render a declaratory judgment in a
moot case. The leading case in support of this argument is
Comrinssioner v. Proctor"0 involving a remainder interest placed
67. C. LOwIxDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 384
(2d ed. 1962).
68. Id.
69. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(a) (1958).
70. 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944).
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in trust with the provision that the corpus should pass to the
donor's children if no gift tax is assessed. The court held that
the gift tax should be assessed and that the provision designed
to avoid it was without tax effect as contrary to public policy.
The court supported its decision by noting three objections to
clauses containing alternative provisions: (1) they tend to dis-
courage collection of the tax by public officials charged with
its collection; (2) they obstruct the administration of justice by
requiring courts to pass on moot cases; (3) they operate so as to
require courts to make a declaratory judgment.71
Applied to an alternative provision in a marital deduction
case, the Proctor argument is that the judgment would have no
effect as to the parties involved. If the power-over-a-dollar-
amount provision was not allowed as a deduction, the clause
would operate to substitute the qualifying alternative. There
would be no change in the tax picture of the husband's estate.
As far as discouraging the collection efforts of public officials, if
the Service were only worried about the tax consequences on the
husband's estate, there would be no reason to seek a deficiency
since it is clear that the court would either approve the dollar
amount and deny the deduction, or deny the dollar amount
thereby substituting the alternative provision. The declaratory
judgment argument contends that the court is being asked to
determine which interest will pass by demonstrating the tax
consequences of the alternatives, thus being forced to construe
the will.
These moot case and declaratory judgment arguments, while
valid in some cases, do not stand up under close scrutiny in the
marital deduction context. Although the decision of the court
would not operate to change the tax burdens on the husband's
estate, there would still be incentive for the Government to
deny the power-over-a-dollar-amount and attempt to collect the
deficiency. This is because of the potential estate tax revenue
loss when the widow's estate tax return is filed. This same fact
serves to rebut the argument that the decision would have no
tax consequences.
Of course, the foregoing objections to alternative drafting
provisions carry different weights when applied to specific pro-
71. The actual language of the opinion stated that they operate to
render the final judgment of a court to be held for naught. The court
noted that essentially this would be a declaratory judgment of the type
barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964),
which authorizes declaratory judgments over actual controversies ex-
cept those involving federal tax issues. 142 F.2d at 827.
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visions. Thus, further consideration of these objections will be
included in the following discussion of various possible clauses
containing alternative provisions. While the alternative provi-
sions could be expressed in several different ways, such clauses
would probably employ either one of two basic approaches: al-
ternative powers over the same trust assets or multiple trusts.
A. ALTERNATwVE PowEas OVER THE Sxim TRUST ASSETS
In clauses employing this approach, there would be a power-
over-a-dollar-amount "specific portion" and, in the event such a
power failed to qualify for the marital deduction, a power over
the entire trust assets in lieu of the "specific portion" power. The
manner of funding the trust is not significant under this approach
to stating the alternative provisions, and any one of the common
forms of describing the bequest to the marital trust may be used:
non-formula pecuniary amount; formula pecuniary amount; non-
formula fractional share; formula fractional share. Since the
second alternative power is over the entire trust assets, any "spe-
cific portion" difficulties are eliminated.
If both the amount of the trust corpus and the specified dol-
lar-amount power were identical-as, for example, where both
are stated by a formula clause to be the exact maximum marital
deduction-this raises the danger that the dollar amount power
would be construed to be a power over the entire corpus, thus
defeating the purpose of the dollar-amount provision.72 This
danger would be lessened by a funding of the trust in excess of
the dollar-amount power. While this might result in overfunding
the marital share, the excess amount can be kept to a minimum.
Another example of the first approach to alternative provi-
sions would express the alternative "assured-marital-deduction"
power in fractional terms so that the amount determined by the
fraction would equal the specified dollar amount. In the event
the power-over-a-dollar-amount specific portion did not qualify
for the marital deduction, the alternative power would be over
that fraction of the total corpus formed by using the dollar
amount interest as numerator and the total corpus value as de-
nominator. There is no contingency in the marital deduction
amount here; the only question is how the interest is defined.
However, the second alternative would clearly include in the
wife's estate any increase in the value of the appointive assets
subsequent to the husband's death.7 3
72. See note 66 supra.
73. It is true that the alternatives here could accurately be ex-
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The first category of alternatives does raise the possibility
of a stronger declaratory judgment argument. If the testator
is allowed to set up one alternative, he could conceivably set up
several, simply arranging them in descending order of preference.
The court would have to decide which alternative qualified for
the deduction. Carried to this extreme a court might be
justified in relying on the Declaratory Judgment Act to invali-
date the clause.
B. MULTIPLE TRUSTS
A more promising category of clauses using alternative pro-
visions provides for a power-over-a-dollar-amount trust and an
"assured-marital-deduction" clause in the form of a marital de-
duction formula trust. The marital deduction formula clause
assures that the widow will receive an amount exactly equal to
the maximum marital deduction of 50 per cent of the decedent's
adjusted gross estate. It does so by providing for the adjustment
of the widow's share after considering all the interests she has re-
ceived, other than under decedent's will, that are part of the
decedent's gross estate and qualify for the marital deduction.7 4
Since its goal is an amount equal to the maximum marital deduc-
tion and nothing more, the use of the formula trust as an alterna-
tive drafting measure eliminates any terminable interest objec-
tion due to difficulty in calculating the amount the widow will
receive. As will be seen, the use of the formula trust should
also defeat any remaining contingency arguments.
Using this approach the amount of assets passing to the
second trust would be determined by whether or not the assets
in the first trust containing a power-over-a-dollar-amount qual-
ified for the marital deduction. Such power-over-a-dollar-
amount would be exercisable only in the event it qualified for
the marital deduction in the husband's estate as a power over a
pressed as a power-over-a-dollar-amount portion or a power-over-a-
dollar-amount portion plus any appreciation or minus any depreciation
that might occur during the life of the surviving spouse. However,
looking at the situation at the time the amount of the marital deduction
is determined, no appreciation or depreciation can be considered.
74. A typical legacy formula provision is:
If my wife shall survive me, I give to her a legacy [either
outright or in trust3 in an amount equal to one-half of the
value of my adjusted gross estate, as finally determined in the
United States estate tax proceeding relating to my estate, re-
duced by the total of any other amounts allowed as a marital
deduction in said proceeding.




specific portion. The executor would file the estate tax return
with the dollar amount making up the marital deduction. If
it were determined that the dollar amount did not qualify, then
the executor would fund the marital trust pursuant to the for-
mula's instructions and the deductions would be secured. There
would be no danger of double taxation here since the widow's
interest in the dollar amount trust would be limited to income
rights. The absence of the power of appointment would preclude
its inclusion in her estate.75
If the power of appointment were not conditional, and if
the dollar amount specific portion did not qualify, then the dollar
amount trust corpus would be taxed in both the husband's and
the wife's estates. 76 Thus, before using this approach the plan-
ner would have to balance the potential estate tax savings in
case of asset appreciation against the possibility of double estate
taxation.77 Of course, if the power were not conditional there
could be no possible terminable interest objection.
The declaratory judgment and terminable interest arguments
lose force against this category. The need for a determination of
whether one interest qualifies for the deduction is commonplace 78
75. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041.
76. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2041. A simple example would be
a testator with a $400,000 estate. The first trust would receive $200,000
with the widow receiving income from $100,000 and the power to appoint
that "specific portion." The children would receive rights to the other
$100,000 and possibly the appreciation from the widow's $100,000. If the
dollar amount interest does qualify the formula trust would receive
$100,000. If the dollar amount interest does not qualify then the for-
mula would operate to fund the alternative trust to $200,000. Of course
the widow would still receive the income from the original $100,000, but
that amount would not be taxed to her estate.
77. A related suggestion has been made, see Covey, New Doctrines
on Marital Deductions, 101 T. & E. 322, 395 (1962), combining a formula
provision marital trust and a trust from which the spouse has a right to
withdraw the greater of $5000 or five per cent of the principal each year.
Using actuarial computations, as sanctioned by Gelb, the value of the
withdrawal right can be computed to give a dollar amount which might
qualify for the marital deduction. If the dollar amount qualified, a
substantial tax avoidance would be possible, but if not, the formula pro-
vision would operate to secure the maximum marital deduction. How-
ever, Covey points out that the plan should not succeed since the power
is really a number of powers coming into existence at the rate of one
per year and thus could not be considered as exercisable "in all events."
Id. at 394.
As an alternative, Covey suggests a right to withdraw, in addition to
the $5000 or five per cent, the present actuarial value of the power. This
appears to satisfy the "all events" requirement thereby qualifying the
actuarial amount.
78. The typical formula provision states that the final determi-
nations in the United States estate tax proceeding shall be used
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and thus a necessary exception to the exclusion of federal tax
cases from the declaratory judgment power of the federal courts.
Certainly the marital deduction formula clause would be an
example where such a decision would have to be made in order
for the formula to operate. The executor has a duty to fund the
marital trust to achieve the maximum marital deduction. When
he files the estate tax return, claiming that other interests besides
the formula trust qualify for the deduction, and one of these in-
terests is held not to qualify, he would have the duty to fund the
trust with an additional amount in order to make up for the loss
in deductions. 79
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the dissent in Northeastern is correct
in pointing to a possible estate tax "loop-hole" opened up by
the majority's decision. A literal reading of the statute com-
bined with acceptance of dollar amount, as well as fractional
shares, as "specific portions" would give this result. But the tone
of the majority opinion does not justify the belief that such a
result is either intended or inevitable. The requirement of a
fractional or percentile share on the Northeastern facts was not
necessary to prevent revenue loss and it is not clear that
Congress intended to restrict the flexibility of the deduction pro-
vision by imposing such a limitation. The majority indicated its
desire to secure flexibility for testators in common law juris-
dictions while retaining tax parity with community property
jurisdictions. The Court specifically limits qualification of dollar
amount provisions to the facts of the case and positively states
that nothing in the opinion is intended to apply to cases in-
volving potential tax avoidance. It therefore seems probable
that a case involving possible tax avoidance, such as the one
posed by the dissent, would be decided differently.
Even if presented with a case involving potential tax avoid-
in computing the amount of property disposed under any other
provision of the will or outside of the will which qualifies for
the marital deduction and the amount of property disposed of
by the provision.
Covey, supra note 76, at 395 n.31.
79. An example of a case where this might occur is the typical
widow's allowance dispute where the Government attempts to deny a
deduction in the amount of the allowance on the ground that it is a
terminable interest. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503
(1964); Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 395. If the estate involved a
marital deduction formula trust, once the allowance was deemed term-
inable (and thus non-deductible) the executor would have to add to the
marital trust pursuant to the formula provisions.
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ance, it is conceivable that the Court would leave the "loop-hole"
for Congress to fill. Considering the size of the potential estate
tax savings, it would be wise for the estate planner to attempt to
take advantage of this possibility if at the same time he can
avoid the risk of losing the marital deduction altogether. A
clause containing alternative power-over-a-dollar-amount and
"assured-marital-deduction" provisions appears to achieve this
result. Although the contingency and the declarative judgment
objections exist, they should not be a bar to the use of such a
clause in the marital deduction context.3 0
80. It would seem that the public policy arguments, as set forth in
Proctor, could be successfully answered in the context of a marital de-
duction formula trust alternative proposal. However, if there were
sufficient doubt to deter the estate planner from attempting such an
alternative proposal, there is a third possible provision that incorporates
the formula trust without being subject to the declarative judgment
arguments. This would be a power-over-a-dollar-amount trust and al-
ternative marital deduction formula trust with the power contingent
upon the dollar amount deduction being allowed as a settled matter of
law at the time of the testator's death. Any questions could be decided
by the appropriate probate court, since the determination would not be
whether the dollar amount did qualify, but whether it was a settled
matter that it qualified. Of course, this alternative would not provide
an opportunity for tax avoidance if the matter had not previously been
decided, but it would do so for the cases following such a decision.
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